This paper explores the behaviour of infl ation expectations across countries that share their monetary policy, in particular those of the European Monetary Union. We investigate the possible common features at the various horizons, as well as differentials across euro area countries. A multi-country dynamic factor model based on Diebold et al. (2008) , where we also add a liquidity risk component, is proposed and estimated using daily data from infl ation swaps for Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the euro area as a whole, and for a wide range of horizons. It allows us to calculate the proportion of common vs country-specifi c components in the term structure of infl ation expectations. We fi nd sizable differences in infl ation expectations across the main euro area countries only at short maturities, while in general a common component predominates throughout the years, especially at long horizons. The common long-run level of infl ation expectations is estimated to have fallen since late 2014, while an increased persistence of lower expected infl ation and for longer horizons is estimated from 2012. There has been no reversal in either of these characteristics following the announcement and implementation of the ECB's unconventional monetary policy measures.
Introduction
How are inflation expectations formed across countries that share their monetary policy? The question is not trivial. In the long run, and under full credibility of the common monetary authority, agents in all countries belonging to a monetary union should expect the same inflation rate: the monetary policy target. However, at shorter horizons, individual countries' expected inflation could reflect countryspecific factors due to different fundamentals affecting short-to-medium run inflation dynamics.
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What is the behavior of inflation expectations across countries in the European
Monetary Union (EMU)? Do they share common features at the various horizons or do expected inflation differentials across Euro area countries emerge at different horizons, say, more at shorter than longer horizons? Has the degree of common behavior changed over time? And, in terms of direct monetary policy implications, has the long-run expected inflation remained well anchored across these countries at the European Central Bank (ECB) target of below, but close to 2%?
This paper provides an empirical approximation to answer these questions. The challenge starts with the very issue of constructing a good measure of inflation expectations at different horizons and for different countries. We use financial marketbased daily data from inflation swaps, which exist for the four biggest EMU countries and for the Euro area aggregate, and provide a very valuable high-frequency source of information. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to use these data. In particular, bid and ask rates for Zero-Coupon Inflation-Linked Swaps (ILS) are available for Spain, Italy, France, Germany and the Euro area, and for a wide set of maturities ranging from 1 to 30 years. From these quotes, we obtain not only mid-prices, but also bid-ask spreads that approximate the liquidity of each contract.
We compare the market-based ILS information to the other usual source of inflation expectations: survey-based data, which is available for the same countries on a monthly and half-yearly basis from Consensus Forecasts (CF). CF covers expectations for longer horizons than other surveys that refer also to inflation expectations, such as the Business and Consumer Survey of the European Commission. g 1 Among these could be, for instance, different oil-dependencies across countries which can cause the same change in world oil prices to have different impacts in the short run, or fiscal measures in one country causing its VAT taxes or regulated prices to rise.
mary statistics about inflation forecasting performance. Contrary to survey data, swaps data is available at a much higher frequency and for a complete set of forecasting horizons, which makes them more suitable for empirical analysis. However, the information on inflation expectations contained in inflation swap contracts may be affected by the possibly limited liquidity of the market as well as by the presence of term premia. We explore these issues in this section, too. Section 3 presents the model used to evaluate commonalities and differences among inflation expectations across the EMU, which is estimated using the ILS daily data. It is a multi-country model based on Diebold et al. (2008) , which allows to compute the proportion of common vs country-specific components in the term structure of inflation expectations. The model proposed here extends Diebold et al. (2008) in several dimensions.
The more important one is to include a model-based measure of time-varying liquidity risk premium. The main findings of the model estimation are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The data
Measuring inflation expectations is usually done through two different types of in- for German inflation. This paper uses data up to August 15th, 2016. Zero-Coupon inflation swap contracts exchange the increase in a price index (P t ) over an agreed period (the contract horizon), that is, the realized inflation rate, against a fixed rate, which is an inflation compensation (π t ) that approximates markets' inflation expectations over the swap contract duration:
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In quoted inflation swap contracts there is an indexation lag of three months, meaning that the reference inflation rate for a swap contract of 2 years maturity today is Section 2 explains the data sources and provides some graphical evidence and sum-the inflation rate 2 for the 24-month period covering the last 3 months and the next 21 months. This is done in order to ensure that at maturity the inflation index that must be used to settle the contract is known.
An alternative source for inflation expectations to inflation swaps would be inflationlinked bonds (equivalent to American TIPS). However, this market is not as developed in Euro area countries as it is in the US: most inflation linked bonds provide protection against Euro area inflation, and not national inflation. 3 In addition to the scarcity of bonds and the different level of market development, extracting a valid inflation compensation in those bonds is not simple. First, the number of bonds available to obtain a reliable daily curve is limited, but more importantly, Apart from financial markets, the other main source of information for inflation expectations is surveys. In the case of the main Euro area countries, Consensus
Economics surveys every month a panel of 10 to 30 private sector financial and economic forecasters per country for their estimates of a range of variables, including future GDP growth, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. In particular, every month they provide their expectation for the average inflation rate for current and next calendar years. These Consensus Forecasts (CF) are published in the second week of each month, based on a survey performed in the previous two weeks. 4 Twice 2 In the case of the swap rates used in this paper, the reference inflation rate is the national total CPI inflation rate for the ILS for Spain and Germany, and the national CPI inflation excluding BTPi were linked to Italian inflation (10 and 8 bonds, respectively). 4 Hence, one can safely assume that the information contained in the survey corresponds to the last day of the previous month, when comparing these monthly series to daily financial marketbased data.
a year, the April and October CF surveys also provide longer-term forecasts which include expected annual inflation for the current and next five years, as well as the average annual inflation expected for the following five years, that is, from 6 to 10 years ahead. Swap rates react quicker and may reflect better real-time changes in inflation expectations than survey-based measures: not only the data is available at higher frequency (daily vs monthly or semi-annually) but also the reference inflation moves gradually as time goes by, as opposed to the CF case where the reference inflation changes abruptly at year end. 6 But despite the differences in the exact period of the reference inflation in the CF survey and the swap rates, 7 they track each other 5 We use HICP instead of CPI for cross-country comparability reasons. The three month indexation lag in swap contracts means that the reference inflation rate for swap1y spans from the previous 3 months to the current and next 8 months. 6 The fact that the survey asks for the same current and next year every month of the calendar year is reflected in some jumps in the CF series: forecasters seem to change less their perceptions of the same year as months go by than what they predict will be the change in inflation from one year to the next one.
7 From the January CF survey to the December one of the same year, current year inflation expectations, CF(y), refers to the same annual inflation rate at year end. However, the swap rate for one-year maturity, swap1y, refers to the inflation rate for a 12-month period which moves quite closely.
with time. From January to December of year y it moves from covering the 12-month period of October(y − 1)-September(y) to covering that of September(y)-August(y + 1), respectively. Hence, the overlap between CF survey and ILS markets annual inflation references changes throughout the year, reaching a total overlap of 12 months only in April each year, and decaying with the time distance with respect to the previous or the next April. Figure 1 . Annual Inflation expectations from financial markets (1year-ILSwaps, in blue) and survey (Consensus Forecast for the current calendar year, in green). In red, the realized reference annual HICP inflation for swaps contracts, with the appropriate lag (current month+8months). Figure 2b: Annual Inflation expectations at various horizons from financial markets (ILSwaps 1y4y, 1y5y, and 5y5y, in blue) and survey (Consensus Forecast for y+4, y+5, and avg(y+6 to y+10), in green). In red, the realized annual HICP inflation for the corresponding swap contract, with the appropriate lag. Comparing survey-vs financial market-based information at different horizons, there doesn't seem to be any systematic bias in any of the two at the shorter horizons;
they move close to each other. At longer maturities, though, the sample mean of swap rates tends to be, on average, somewhat higher than survey forecasts: the latter stay closer to the "close but below 2%" reference related to the ECB target the longer the forecasting horizon, while the swap rates show wider fluctuations even at long maturities. The standard deviations of expected inflation in all countries and sources of information is lower the longer the horizon, where the liquidity improves.
Swaps tend to have larger volatility than survey expectations (except for the spot one year swaps, swap1y), especially at the longest horizons. maturities. In the case of Italy, there is a substantial deviation between the two sources of inflation expectations from 2013 onwards at short-to-medium horizons:
swaps rates lie under survey forecasts, with large discrepancies at times, hinting at a substantial disinflation risk being priced in in swap markets for that country.
Finally, the case of Germany deserves some attention. While, in general, swap rates for German inflation seem to have a reasonable evolution, especially at shorter maturities, outliers are more abundant than in the other countries and high frequency volatility essentially disappears in 2012 for all maturities. We interpret this outcome as a consequence in the reduction of data contributors to this market segment.
This would imply that the analysis of German swaps after 2012 have to be taken with great caution because of the lower quality of the data. For this reason, we have opted to use German swaps rates only until May 2012 in the estimation of the multi-country model of Section 3.
In terms of how well the two information sets forecast actual inflation, only at the shortest horizons depicted in Figure 1 , they seem to forecast inflation successfully.
This makes both measures of inflation expectations valuable in terms of monitoring and forecasting inflation, since they are available with a considerable lead and, in the case of swaps, also with a high frequency with respect to realized inflation.
However, for longer horizons graphical inspection of Figure 2 suffices to predict a bad forecasting record. Table 1 The lack of good forecasting performance for longer horizons does not mean that neither ILS nor CF produce any useful information about inflation expectations.
Market participants may have some ex-ante expectations about future inflation that may or may not coincide with ex-post realized inflation. This is especially the case in periods like the crisis or the posterior low-inflation environment, which were not predicted by market participants or analysts. 
The liquidity of inflation linked swaps
Contrary to survey data, ILS data is available at a much higher frequency and for a more complete set of horizons, and hence seems more suitable for empirical analysis on inflation expectations. Moreover, the descriptive analysis above suggests that ILS are comparable to survey-based measures of inflation expectations in terms of forecasting performance or other basic properties. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the previous section, the inflation expectations signal in swap rates may be hidden by an excess of volatility. One important source for this volatility in forward rates can be the existence of low levels of liquidity in the inflation swap markets. They are clearly less liquid markets than other swap markets (especially interest rate swaps like the OIS).
It is generally accepted that the Euro area inflation swap is the most liquid among the inflation swap markets, but country-specific contracts may have lower levels of liquidity. Although there is no information available on traded volume, there is daily information on the closing bid-ask spread of the inflation swaps for each country and maturity. Such spreads can be used to estimate a potential liquidity risk (i.e., the loss over the mid price in case that an investor wants to close a current position in inflation swaps), and has been used for this purpose in other markets (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1991) . Figure 3 plots these series for each country and the Euro area for all available maturities.
9 As can be seen, the level of the bid-ask spread varies considerably between countries, and is clearly time-varying (reaching a maximum during the peaks of the financial crisis). It is also clear that those contracts with higher maturity are the more liquid ones, where the bid-ask spreads are smallest.
9 Given their high volatility, the bid-ask spreads are represented using rolling windows of 20 days.
Looking by country, French swaps enjoy a level of liquidity similar to those of the Euro area aggregate, while Spanish and Italian swaps have much higher bid-ask spreads. The case of German swaps deserve especial consideration. Before 2012, the evolution of the bid-ask spreads at all maturities is similar to those of Spain and
Italy, but, afterwards, there is no change in those spreads. As mentioned before, we interpret this outcome as a consequence in the reduction of data contributors to this In addition to being a measure of potential liquidity risk, the spread between bid and ask has a direct repercussion into the swap rate. Swap rates are computed as the mid-quote (the average of the bid and the ask), and therefore the bigger the spread the higher the measurement error in the swap rate data. Hence, we will include the bid-ask spreads directly affecting both measurement error and liquidity risk premia within the more complete model of inflation expectations term structure of the next section.
Term premium in Inflation Linked Swaps
There is also the possibility that market participants may be willing to pay/demand a compensation for increasing inflation uncertainty the longer the duration of the anchored inflation expectations, one should expect that uncertainty would be higher for the short run than for an average of a longer horizon. In that case, the term premium should be inverted (higher for a zero coupon ILS with shorter maturity, than for a zero coupon ILS with a long maturity). By contrast, a period of deanchoring would imply an increase in inflation uncertainty and a potential increase in the term premium at longer maturities.
In order to assess the possible presence of a term premium we first estimate a model of inflation expectations in the following Section 3 and then we compare the implied forward rate in the observed ILS rates with a model-based forecast obtained with such model. In absence of a term premium, the expected rate should be equivalent to the forward rate (i.e. pure expectations hypothesis. See Fama and Bliss, 1987) .
In contrast, differences between model-based forecasts and observed forward rates can be mostly associated with a term premium.
A multicountry model of inflation expectations
Once analyzed the basic properties of inflation expectations data, we turn to the 
Diebold and Li (2006) depending on whether the contract is protecting from high inflation or low inflation, respectively. Thus, in our case, we do not restrict this factor to be positive. 
The structure defined by H m does not need to be estimated, since coefficients are known, and also ensures the identification of the latent factors. The first three latent factors in F it correspond to the term structure curves for inflation expectations in the swap rates. The level L it represents the asymptotic long run value for the inflation rate, that is, the end point of the curve (lim m→∞ H(m) = 1 0 0 BA ). The slope S it is the difference between the level and the shortest maturity, which is the starting point of the curve (lim m→0 H(m) = 1 1 0 BA ). Therefore, the level plus the slope determine the short-term expected value for the ILS rates. Finally, the curvature C it determines the shape of the curve, the speed of convergence of short-term to long-term inflation expectations, i.e. negative values will delay the convergence to the long run level while positive ones will accelerate the convergence.
This third element in H(m) has the shape of an inverted U, with a maximum around 3.5 years.
Following the multi-country structure of Diebold et al. (2008), we decompose the unobserved time-varying factors in F it into their global (G) and national components (N ). That is,
Identification can be an important problem with this decomposition, but we can circumvent this by making use of the information available specific to the global factors. Since inflation swaps are also traded for the Euro area as a whole, we will have that for ILS EA , , times its unobserved price R it . Contrary to the other unobserved factors -level, slope and curvature-, we consider that country-differences in R it do not make much sense given the possibility for any agent to participate in any of these inflation swaps markets, and hence we interpret that R it is essentially common across the Euro area, that is, there is only a common global component (GR t ) to it and not different national components. To take into account the potential different level of depth in each country ILS market, we just transform the global price of liquidity risk (GR t ) into each country price of risk (R it ) by multiplying it by γ Ri coefficients.
For the state equation, we assume that all latent factors (GL t , GS t , GC t , NL it , NS it , NC it , and GR t ) follow a random walk, where ε t N [0, Q] and Q is restricted to be diagonal and constant.
11 In order to identify both GR t factor and γ Ri coefficients, we impose the standard deviation of ε Rt to be equal to 1.
In equation (6) 
Model estimation results
What does the model tell us about the behavior of market-based inflation expectations across countries in the European Monetary Union? A good way of summarizing the estimation results of the above model is Figure 4a , which represents the common (in pink) and country-specific (red for Spain, blue for France, green for Italy and black for Germany) components of the level, slope and curvature estimates. Figure   4b represents the same factors (solid lines) with their 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), showing that all factors are estimated with high precision. It is interesting to note also that, as discussed in Section 3, the estimated common price of liquidity risk (bottom right panel in Figure 4a ) effectively shows both positive and negative values, depending on whether ILS contracts are protecting from high inflation or from low inflation, as well as a high volatility.
Do inflation swap rates share common features across EMU countries at the various horizons?
It is immediate to see that the national components of the level, that is, the crosscountry differences in the asymptotic long run value expected for the inflation rate, are really small compared to the common part. This confirms the intuition that, in the long run, agents in countries belonging to a monetary union should expect the same inflation rate. Contrary to the mostly common level estimates, differences across countries emerge through time in the term structure parameters that determine short-term inflation swap rates (slope) or the speed of convergence of these towards the long-run (curvature). In the case of the slope, different countries 
Price of Risk
Price of Risk Figure 4b . Common and country-specific components of the level, slope and curvature factors estimated in the multi-country model using Zero-Coupon Inflation Swap yields for Italy, Spain, France, Germany and euro area, with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Common EA Country Specific Liquidity Premium Figure 6 . Decomposition of Italian Inflation Swaps at 1 year maturity (swap1y, top left); 10 year maturity (top right); 1-year forward 4 years ahead (swap1y4y, bottom right); and 5-year forward 5 years ahead (swap5y5y, bottom left). 
Common EA Country Specific Liquidity Premium Figure 7 . Decomposition of French Inflation Swaps at 1 year maturity (swap1y, top left); 10 year maturity (top right); 1-year forward 4 years ahead (swap1y4y, bottom right); and 5-year forward 5 years ahead (swap5y5y, bottom left). 
Common EA Country Specific Liquidity Premium Figure 8 . Decomposition of German Inflation Swaps at 1 year maturity (swap1y, top left); 10 year maturity (top right); 1-year forward 4 years ahead (swap1y4y, bottom right); and 5-year forward 5 years ahead (swap5y5y, bottom left). Liquidity premium are relative small, higher in the short maturities and smaller in the long ones, with the smallest weight for the French ILS and higher for German and Spanish ones. In the case of the noise, it is higher for the shorter maturities, and representing less than 2% for all cases in the 10 years ILS.
All in all, the model estimates seem to confirm that sizable differences in inflation expectations term structures across Euro area countries may be found at short maturities, while they are similar at the longer horizons. The common level estimate of the model (see Figure 4) 
Is there an inflation premium in ILS?
As we showed in section 2, ILS have small divergences from CF surveys, and the forecasting accuracy of both are similar, although slightly higher for the CF in the longer horizons. This might be a signal of a small inflation premium, as explored in bond markets by Gürkaynak et al. (2010) for the US and García and Werner (2010) for the Euro area. Thus, we use the model proposed in section 3 to empirically test the presence of sizeable term premia in our data of ILS in the Euro area.
In particular, we compare the implied forward rate in the observed data with the model-based forecast. In absence of a term premium, the expected rate should be equivalent to the forward rate (i.e. pure expectations hypothesis. See Fama and Bliss, 1987) . In contrast, differences between model-based forecasts and observed forward rates can be mostly associated with a term premium. We have opted for However, this exercise is based on assuming that the difference between forecast inflation rates and forward inflation rates are due to the term premium and not to prediction errors. In order to asses if differences between both measures are consistent with no term premium (that is, if forward inflation rate are inside forecast confidence intervals), for each day, we have run 10.000 simulations to obtain a full density forecast. Then, for each day we compare the forward rate with the corresponding density forecast. 12 In figure 11 , we present the order position of each observed forward inflation measure, compared with the full density forecast from the model. Thus, a 50% value implies that 50% of the forecasts are above the forward rate and 50% are bellow the forward rate. As can be seen, for all countries and forward measures, the forward rates are inside the 95% confidence intervals of the density forecasts; we are not able to reject the hypothesis that the forward rates are 12 These are in-sample density forecast. Out of sample densities would have implied greater
bands, confirming what we observe for the in-sample. Moreover, the purpose of the exercise is not the forecast but to detect the presence of a potential term premium.
within the limits of the densities estimated. This means that, in spite of the term premium estimates in Figure 10 , there is no clear evidence of sizable bias in the observed forward ILS rates and that, therefore, there doesn't seem to be on average a term premium different from zero in the ILS in the Euro area. 
Euro Area
Expected Inflation Term Premium 1Yo4Y Figure 11 . Comparison of the Forward rates (1y9y, blue, 1y4y, red, and 5y5y, green) with the density forecast of the model proposed in section 3. Density forecasts are obtained with 10.000 simulations. The value reported is the proportion of those simulated forecasts that lie below the corresponding observed forward rates. We have found that in the last two years (2015-2016) and in the mid-term horizon the decline in forward inflation rates in all countries considered, as well as the Euro area as a whole, can be related to a decline in the term premium that has almost disappeared by now. However, from our analysis, it is not clear that we can reject the hypothesis that the term premium is equal to zero in inflation swaps, since differences between forward and forecast measures are well inside forecast confidence intervals.
Further research on the issue is in our agenda.
We are also interested in determining whether the long-run expected inflation has remained well anchored across these countries. The model allows to compute the proportion of common vs country-specific components in the term structure of inflation expectations. Sizable differences in inflation expectations across the main Euro area countries are found only at short maturities,
